New Delhi, Nov.28 (ANI): The shortest distance between two points is a straight line. But not in Pakistan, where things evolve in a convoluted and conspiratorial fashion.
The replacement of Pakistan's Ambassador Hussain Haqqani was not through a direct Prime Ministerial order but intrigue through a memo supposedly written by or on behalf of the country's political leadership to American leadership seeking protection against its own Army and then leaked to seek the removal of those seeking assistance.
Here was a man representing his country's sovereignty arraigned publicly and equated with a con man known for his propensity to drop names and fabricate information. Nothing indicates the mind of the powers that be in Pakistan than this equation and the eagerness to condemn and punish Haqqani.
Surely, Haqqani knew of and about Mansoor Ijaz. Besides, it is indeed very strange that Haqqani should need Ijaz to deliver such a sensitive message. In fact such a memo would not even exist. Discussions of this kind would be only oral.
The contents of the memo are also odd. Five of the six offers are about giving comfort to the US on terrorism; unavoidably, as this has become Pakistan's identity and chief export. That bit about India and 26/11 Mumbai was odd but designed to convince the Americans that they were serious about changing policy.
The received wisdom on this is that this memo is an elaborate and a clumsy fake.
An Army that had been reeling under multiple embarrassments after the Osama bin Laden killing in May needed a come back. Their constant refrain that they did not know the whereabouts of OBL, was exposed. They had been caught harbouring the world's most wanted terrorist and their most valuable strategic bargaining chip with the Americans.
The US trusted the Army even less, loud proclamations notwithstanding. They were shown as incompetent by one section of the population that believed in the creed of OBL and untrustworthy by the rest.
The truth is that the Pak Army has been stalking Husain Haqqani even before he became his country's representative in DC. He had earned the Army's permanent enmity after he wrote the book "Pakistan: between mosque and military" in 2005. His appointment as Ambassador in 2008 had left the Army seething. There was no likelihood of Zardari agreeing to remove Haqqani, especially when he was delivering in Washington. There had to be recourse to subterfuge.
In few countries does the Army sit in on judgement about the behaviour of the country's diplomatic representatives. In the end the Army reasserted its pre-eminence because Haqqani has been replaced by another Benazir acolyte, Sherry Rehman considered to be close to the Army.
The difference is that while Hussain Haqqani was an avowed Army-hater, his equally suave successor belongs to the elite of Pakistan which survives through traditionally clever arrangements with the Army.
They criticise the Army to show their freedom and independence but that is restricted up to very carefully defined red lines.
For instance, the policy on India will be laid down by the Army; that on Afghanistan similarly defined by GHQ Rawalpindi, currently Pakistan's real capital. For every crime there has to be a motive and one looks for the obvious gainers. In this case it is the Army of Pakistan.
Pakistan's Jinnah Institute of which Sherry Rehman was the Chairman till her recent appointment had prepared a report along with the United States Institute of Peace had been released in September this year. The report, titled 'Pakistan, the United States and the End Game in Afghanistan: Perceptions of Pakistan's Foreign Policy Elite' seems to reflect the Army's point of view.
The report identifies identify three main objectives which the "elite" considered necessary in Afghanistan:
Pakistan's interests were best served by a relatively stable government in Kabul that is not hostile towards Pakistan and that persistent instability in Afghanistan would have numerous and predictable consequences for Pakistan that it is ill-prepared to tackle.
. Pakistan should seek a negotiated configuration with adequate Pashtun representation which would necessarily require the main Taliban factions - particularly Mullah Omar's "Quetta Shura" Taliban and the Haqqani network - to be part of the new political arrangement. This implies that the Taliban and all Pushtun are interchangeable.
There was need to restrict Indian presence to development activities and participate in Afghanistan's economic progress and prosperity. The elite view is that the present Indian engagement was going beyond strictly development. Greater transparency on Indian actions and objectives was needed.
It is believed that Sherry Rehman's endorses this report. The report is that of the Pakistan's foreign policy elite. And the elite in Pakistan has always taken care to remain close to the Army for therein lies its security and prosperity.
Political fortunes
The Army having emerged stronger in the latest bout, political parties like the PML (N) and PTI are making the appropriate overtures unlike the PPP which is handicapped by its past animosities with the Army.
The PML(N)'s uncomfortable and tenuous honeymoon is over, and sees this as an opportunity to gain ground at the expense of the PPP and also wishes to consolidate against the new player, the PTI of Imran Khan.
For this it is necessary to prove loyalties to the strongest force in the country -the Army. Nawaz Sharif has filed a petition in the Supreme Court seeking a probe into the memogate.
This follows his demand in Faisalabad on November 20 for a judicial enquiry into the episode with other party stalwarts describing the government as Zardari mafia and Imran Khan as a pawn of the Army.
At this stage, should the Supreme Court decide to hasten the NRO case against Zardari, his government will be under threat. Beleaguered in this fashion, the PPP will have to rely more and more on the Army.
At the same time, the Army probably sees its best chance to finish the PPP for good.
Other politicians like Mian Azhar, have started to hedge and have joined Imran Khan. Maybe they sense a snap election. Political uncertainties of this kind only help strengthen the Army's stranglehold. In all this infighting and the question of survival of some, relations with India will take a back seat. We should forget about issues like MFN that we have been so eager about and cosmetics apart, there is hardly any likelihood of new breakthroughs in the immediate future.
The strange case of talks with the Taliban
The case of the on-off talks between the Government and the Tehrik Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is getting curious and curiouser. The Pakistan Taliban declared on November 21 that the talks had commenced, the next day there were denials by the Pak Army; thereafter even the Taliban - or sections of the Taliban also announced that there were no ceasefire talks.
To prove their point, they attacked a police station in Dera Ismail Khan killing an officer at dawn on November 22 whereas another Taliban leader had asserted that there was going to be a ceasefire in the South Waziristan area, to allow the month old talks to go ahead.
The received wisdom is that there are factions within the TTP with senior leaders close to Hakimullah Mehsud asserting that Mehsud was in favour of a ceasefire. What however, seems to have upset all arrangements is an attempted suicide attack on a very senior ISI officer on Tuesday November 22 near the ISI headquarters in Abpara, Islamabad. Obviously there is a strong faction within the TTP that is opposed to the peace overtures.
There has been a decline in the TTP activities since 2007-08, suggesting a division within the TTP and possibly this has led the government to adopt a harder stance against them. Interior Minister also declared that talks with the TTP were possible only if they were to lay down their arms. The Pushtun does not lay down his arms even in peacetime; to expect him to do so now is being very optimistic.
Peace deals with the TTP have never endured in the past and there has also been a feeling in the government circles that the TTP uses these opportunities to regroup. This scepticism about the present state of affairs is not without substance. It would be extremely difficult to get all the groups to agree to a peace deal and once agreed how long such a deal would last. The future here, which would be the Pakistan government's first priority on the insurgency front, remains uncertain. (ANI)
Attn: News Editors/News Desks: The views expressed in the above article are that of Mr.Vikram Sood, former Secretary, R and AW. By Vikram Sood
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